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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DISABLED AMERICAN 
VETERANS, UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
VETERANS FOUNDATION, 
a purported non-profit corporation, 
Appella;n.t. 
Case 
No. 8989 
BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Counsel for plaintiff adopts the same designation 
of the parties as has appellant in their brief. 
Plaintiff cannot accept appellant's "Statement of 
Facts.'' We therefore submit our own Statement, and 
will subsequently point out portions of appellant's state-
ments which do not conform to Rule 75 (P) (2) (2), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The issue in this case is simple, although the facts 
are somewhat burdened by necessary reference to numer-
ous documents. 
The State Executive Committee of the Disabled 
American Veterans in an official meeting appointed a 
committee to act as its fiduciary agent and exercise a 
written contract option (R. 10) to purchase the Veterans 
Foundation, an active salvage business (R. 48). Later 
the State Executive Committee decided to form a non-
profit corporation to handle this purchase. Defendants 
Gray, Hendrixson, Young, and Mabey were named on 
the original purchasing committee and also as members 
of the original Board of Directors of the non-profit 
corporation (R. 48 and 94). The official minutes of the 
State Executive Committee clearly recite that the 
operations of the non-profit corporation are to be prin-
cipally for the benefit of the State Department of the 
D A V (R. 95). Contracts were drawn as will be more 
fully outlined hereinafter, and the salvage business was 
purchased by Appellant after the Plaintiff assigned its 
interest to Appellant in the option contract covering this 
salvage business. The real issue in this case is whether 
these defendants and appellant can now disregard the 
terms of the resolution approving their appointment as 
committee members and members of the Board of Direc-
tors and breach the written fiduciary obligations recited 
in the contracts, resolutions and original articles of 
incorporation of appellant Veterans Foundation. 
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We will now document and substantiate the detailed 
facts briefly referred to in the foregoing opening state-
ment. 
On or about September 9, 1952, plaintiff and Mr. 
Orlo L. Ellison executed the contract marked Exhibit A 
(R. 9-11 inclusive). It was prepared and attested by 
defendant Gay len S. Young as Judge Advocate of the 
Department of Utah D. A. V. (R. 111). Under this con-
tract 10% of the monthly gross sales of a salvage busi-
ness known as "Veterans Foundation" were payable by 
Mr. Ellison to the State Department of Utah D. A. V. 
(R. 9-10). The contract also gives plaintiff an option 
to buy said business from Mr. Ellison (R. 10). It was 
to exercise this option on plaintiff's behalf that defend-
ants, as a committee, were to function. 
The pleadings show that plaintiff alleges and de-
fendants and appellant admit that about June 1955 the 
then State Commander appointed a committee and a 
legal advisor to initiate and conclude a program for the 
acquisition by plaintff from said Ellison of this salvage 
business (R. 3 and 64). The official minutes of the State 
Executive Committee (Exhibits J and K, R. 43-49) recite 
these appointments. Defendants Gray, Hendrixson, 
Young, Astle and Mabey, among others, were appointed 
on said committee to negotiate this purchase for the 
plaintiff State Department (R. 48). 
The official minutes of the State Executive Com-
mittee of the Utah D. A. V. for December 4, 1955 con-
tain a prepared written resolution which was read into 
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said minutes by defendant Young (R. 95). This resolu-
tion approved the creation of a non-profit corporation 
for the purpose of entering into a contract for the pur-
chase of the salvage business from Mr. Ellison. It also 
approved the assignment of the September 1952 contract 
to the new non-profit corporation (R. 95). The articles 
of incorporation for the new non-profit corporation 
(appellant) were already prepared and were read by 
defendant Young to the State Executive Committee and 
approved this same day (R. 94). This resolution further 
provided that the 1952 contract should be cancelled by 
mutual consent at the time the non-profit corporation 
entered into a purchase contract with Mr. Ellison for 
the acquisition of the salvage business (R. 95). 
The resolution contains this statement: 
"It is further understood that the said Vet-
erans Foundation, a non profit corporation, shall 
be operated principally for and on behalf of the 
disabled veterans as more particularly outlined 
in Article IV of the Articles of Incorporation of 
said 'Veterans Foundation' and that out of the 
net profits of said corporation an amount equal 
to 10% of the gross sales shall be paid to the 
Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans 
by said Veterans Foundation and as much more 
as may be possible shall be used for the objects 
of said corporation's creation, all of which is to 
be consistent with good business practice." 
(Italics added) (R. 95) 
The Article IV referred to in this resolution reads 
as follows: 
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''ARTICLE IV 
"PURPOSE: The objects, business and pur-
suits of this corporation shall be: 
''A. To aid and assist veterans, and particu-
larly war-time disabled veterans, their widows, 
their orphans, and their dependents, by providing 
employment and rehabilitation opportunities; to 
work with, or aid financially, any public or private 
agencies devoted to the cause of improving and 
advancing the condition, health and interest of 
all wounded, gassed, injured and disabled vet-
erans. 
''B. To carry out the policies, purposes, ideals 
and programs of the disabled American Veterans, 
nationally and in the State of Utah. 
"C. For the accomplishment of these objects, 
this corporation shall have the power to engage 
in the general salvage business, among other 
things to solicit the public for second hand articles, 
including clothing, furniture and other household 
equipment and to repair and recondition the same 
and to offer the same to the public for sale and to 
use the net money received therefrom to carry 
out the purposes and objects of this corporation. 
''GENERAL POWERS : This corporation is 
to have and exercise all the rights and powers 
necessary to carry out its said objects and pur-
suits and to do and perform all the acts and things 
necessary in pursuance of said objects and pur-
poses to the same extent as natural persons might 
or could do, at any place, either as principal or 
agent, or as contractor, trustee, or otherwise, 
alone or in company with others; to lease suitable 
buildings and equipment; and to acquire, by pur-
chase or gift, such personal and real property as 
may be necessary to carry out the objects of this 
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corporation; to receive donations of real and per-
sonal property to be applied to the uses and pur-
poses of the corporation; to take, hold and manage 
real and personal property conveyed to it in fee 
or in trust, the income from which is to be applied 
to the uses and purposes of this corporation, and 
to execute such trusts; to mortgage or otherwise 
incumber any of its property, or to sell and convey 
the same, or to enter into any contract therewith. 
The enumeration of any specific objects, purpose 
or powers herein shall not be construed as a limi-
tation or abridgement of the general powers of 
the Association." (R. 17 -18) 
There is no reference in Article IV as it was ap-
proved on December 4, 1955 to payment of any part of 
the 10% of gross profits to local chapters (R. 17). Nor 
was there any provision in said Article IV whereby the 
State Department was required to make reports to ap-
pellant and authorizing appellant to judge the wisdom 
of plaintiff's use of its own funds. Nor was there any 
authorization to withhold funds in the future if appellant 
desired (R. 17). The section IV quoted and referred to 
by appellant throughout its brief which does purport 
to authorize these things is an amendment adopted by 
appellant in February 1957 (R. 32, 33 and 38). In fact 
it was the adoption of these amendments to articles of 
incorporation by appellant in February 1957, more than 
any other single factor, which precipitated and resulted 
in this litigation. It fathered the suspicion that appel-
lant intended to divert plaintiff's funds to the local 
chapters. 
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Following the incorporation of appellant in Decem-
ber 1955, the assignment of the September 1952 contract 
to the non-profit corporation was consummated by exe-
cution of Exhibit E, dated Feb. 17, 1956 (R. 22). 
A short time later (February 29, 1956) appellant 
and the Ellisons executed Exhibit F (R. 24-28) entitled 
"Bill of Sale and Title Retaining Note and Agreement." 
By the execution of this agreement appellant completed 
its move into the shoes of plaintiff insofar as contract 
relations with the Ellisons is concerned. Although plain-
tiff was not a party to this contract, it is most significant 
to note that the contract provides that "the Veterans 
Foundation a non-profit corporation, has agreed to give 
to the said State Department of the Utah Disabled 
American Veterans all of the substantial benefits said 
organization is entitled to under the agreement with the 
Ellisons" (R. 24). This contract also provides that ten 
percent of the gross sales shall be paid to the Veterans 
Foundation ''to make it possible for it to carry out its 
commitment with the State Departmen,t of Utah Dis-
abled American Veterans'' (R. 25). 
In March of 1956 the National Adjutant of the Dis-
abled American Veterans officially advised Defendant 
Astle that the National Executive Committee approved 
on a continuing basis, the fund raising project described 
in the Ellison contract (Exhibit A) of September 1952 
(R. 90). However Astle was advised that no changes 
could be made in the operation or in the contract 
describing the operation (R. 90). 
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The National Adjutant then went on to say that he 
had heard about the organization of the newly created 
corporation called "Veterans Foundation." After ana-
lyzing its Articles of Incorporation and the minutes of 
the State Executive Committee meeting of December 4, 
1955 (R. 93-96) he concludes that the whole transaction 
appears to "have been designed to circumvent Depart-
mental control of its own fund raising project" (R. 90). 
Defendant Astle was instructed that if changes in the 
fund raising project had been made as reflected in the 
December 4th minutes and the Articles of Incorporation 
of Veterans Foundation that same must be submitted to 
the National Executive Committee for review under its 
reserved powers. Failure to submit these changes, said 
the National Adjutant, would result in a recommendation 
for National Executive Committee action to revoke plain-
tiff's Charter, or for the institution of legal action in 
Utah courts to cause the revocation of the Charter of 
Veterans Foundation (R. 91). 
Subsequently correspondence passed between de-
fendant Astle and the National Adjutant (R. 92) and 
finally on September 19, 1956, the National Adjutant 
advised the then State Commander that approval of the 
amended fund raising project was conditioned upon 
amendment of Article IV of appellant's Articles of 
Incorporation "to provide that the purpose of the cor-
poration shall be to operate and conduct a salvage busi-
ness for the purpose of raising funds for use by the 
Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans (R. 
101) (Italics added). Several other changes were re-
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quired but they are no longer at issue in this matter. The 
National Executive Committee concluded its recommen-
dations by requesting a submittal of the amended Articles 
for national review "when at least two-thirds of the 
chapters of Utah having a membership of more than 
fifty (50) percent of the paid up membership in the 
department" have approved the amendments (R. 102). 
This approval was never obtained. 
The answer of appellant recites in paragraph 11 
that the National Executive Committee ruled that the 
Articles of Incorporation of the Veterans Foundation 
must be amended to provide that the ''purpose of the 
corporation shall be to operate and conduct a salvage 
business for the purpose of raising funds for use by the 
Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans.'' (R. 
68). 
Appellant's answer recites in considerable detail the 
long negotiations which ensued in an effort to correct 
the situation between the parties hereto (R. 62-78). In 
February 1957 compromise amendments to appellant's 
Articles of Incorporation were adopted by appellant and 
considered by plaintiff, after considerable discussion 
between the parties (R. 87). These amendments (R. 32-
37) were not acceptable to plaintiff and further efforts 
to correct the situation followed (R. 87-88). 
In September 1957 further amendments were adopted 
to limit the membership of appellant to persons in good 
standing of the Department of Utah D. A. V., to delete 
the self perpetuating election procedures whereby de-
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fendants could remain indefinitely as Board Members 
merely by nominating themselves, and to provide that 
upon dissolution of appellant corporation if the Utah 
Department no longer exists, then to turn any remaining 
assets over to the National office for use in assisting 
wartime disabled veterans, etc., living in Utah (R. 41-
42). 
These amendments were presented to the protesting 
local chapters in an effort to secure approval (R. 88) as 
requested by the National Adjutant (R. 102). The 
Thomas Chapter and the Holden Chapter were personally 
visited by the Department Commander and Adjutant, 
and plaintiff's attorney Mangum visited the Thomas 
Chapter urging them to approve these amendments. 
These two posts, having over 50% of state memberships, 
still refused to approve the amendments. "Said officers 
were unable to convince said Chapters that defendants 
and appellant should have the powers that they had 
usurped, and would not approve any power to defendants 
to control the funds of plaintiff." (R. 88) Plaintiff has 
at all times supported the Yeterans sal\age business (R. 
89). 
Despite repeated requests during a long period of 
time appellant and defendants haYe refused to strike 
from Article IV of their Articles of Incorporation the 
provision adopted in February 1957 which authorized 
diversion of funds to the local chapters instead of paying 
the ton percent of gross sales to the State Department. 
DefPndant Young in Chambers of the lower court on 
September 3, 1958, categorically stated that defendants 
10 
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and appellant would never agree to the proposition that 
the ten percent fund should be payable exclusively to 
plaintiff as distinguished from the local chapters (R. 
113). 
On March 27, 1958 appellant notified plaintiff in 
writing (Exhibit G) that no more funds would be paid 
by appellant to plaintiff, and that the moneys would be 
given to the local chapters and be used to pay taxes (R. 
30). Until receipt by plaintiff of Exhibit "G" (R. 29-
30) terminating the ten percent payments, plaintiff had, 
as alleged in paragraph XI of its complaint, hoped 
defendants and appellant would yet honor their trust 
and recognize plaintiff as the exclusive equitable owner 
and beneficiary of appellant corporation. Plaintiff there-
upon instituted this lawsuit. 
The Disabled American Veterans, plaintiff in this 
case, is a body corporate created by act of Congress. 
Congress gave this corporation power to enter into con-
tracts and to sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, 
and also provided that this corporation could establish 
state and territorial organizations and local chapter or 
post organizations. Congress further provided that as 
a condition precedent to the exercise of any power or 
privilege granted or conferred, the Disabled American 
Veterans shall file in the office of the secretary of each 
State in which chapters are organized, the name and 
postoffice address of an authorized agent in such State, 
upon whom legal process or demands against the Dis-
abled American Veterans may be served. (36 U.S.C.A. 
90a, 90d, and 90j.) 
11 
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Plaintiff in an unchallenged sworn statement answer-
ing interrogatories in this case, states that they have 
complied with the mandate of Congress by making the 
proper filing with the Utah Secretary of State (R. 84). 
Plaintiff in answering defendants' interrogatory 
No. 1 relied on the constitution of the Department of 
Utah, Disabled American Veterans, and the National 
Constitution of the Disabled American Veterans (R. 84). 
Article IX, Section 1, of the State Constitution, provides 
that the National Constitution and by-laws of D A V are 
made a part of the State Constitution (R. 114-115). 
Article IV· of the National Constitution specifically pro-
vides for the power to sue and be sued (R. 115). 
Defendants Hendrixson, Reese, Mabey, Gray, Young, 
Astle and Ellison have not appealed from the judgment 
of the lower court, the only party filing an appeal being 
appellant Veterans Foundation (R. 131). 
Defendants Hendrixson, Reese, Mabey, Gray and 
Young are enjoined by a final judgment from withhold-
ing payments to plaintiff of ten percent of the gross 
volume of sales of appellant (R. 129). These same de-
fendants are also under a final court order to amend 
the articles of incorporation of appellant (R. 129). All 
were Board Members at the time this suit was filed. 
The Statement of Facts in appellant's brief (pages 
2-11) fails to comply ·with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in several important statements which we will point out. 
Other similar discrepancies appear throughout theiT brief 
and will be noted hereafter. 
12 
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1. Page 2 of appellant's brief makes no reference 
to the record as a source for the information there recited 
as required by Rule 75 (P) (2) (2). 
2. On page 3 of its brief appellant cites its own 
answer as the source of the information recited (R. 76). 
Plaintiff has the benefit of an automatic denial of facts 
pleaded by an answer for purposes of a motion for sum-
mary judgment. This is therefore a controverted state-
ment. 
3. No reference to the record is made by appellant 
with respect to the facts recited in the last two para-
graphs on page 6 of its brief. 
4. No reference to the record is made by appellant 
with respect to the first full sentence beginning at the 
top of page 10 of its brief. 
Plaintiff will argue this matter under the following 
Statement of Points: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS A STATUTORY "SUBDIVISION" OF 
A BODY CORPORATE CREATED BY ACT OF CON-
GRESS WITH STATUTORY POWER TO SUE. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT ENJOINING AP-
PELLANT FROM FURTHER WITHHOLDING PAY-
13 
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MENTS TO PLAINTIFF OF TEN PERCENT OF GROSS 
VOLUME OF SALES OF VETERAN'S FOUNDATION 
IS PROPER AND VALID. 
POINT III 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT REQUIRING APPEL-
LANT TO AMEND AND CHANGE ARTICLE IV OF 
APPELLANT'S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION IS 
PROPER AND VALID. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS A STATUTORY "SUBDIVISION'' OF 
A BODY CORPORATE CREATED BY ACT OF CON-
GRESS WITH STATUTORY POWER TO SUE. 
Plaintiff in this case is the Disabled American Vet-
erans, Utah State Department. Plaintiff is a statutory 
''subdivision'' of the national corporation, and one of 
the entities given sole and exclusive right to have and 
use the name "Disabled American Veterans," 36 
USCA 90h. 
Disabled American Veterans, incorporated by Act 
of Congress, was by statute given the specific power to 
establish State organizations. 36 USCA 90d. Appellant 
admits that plaintiff is an organization established by 
the Dis a bled American Veterans pursuant to section 90d 
of Chapter 6A, Title 30, USCA. (Appellant's answer, 
R.. 62) Disabled American Veterans is doing business in 
the State of Utah by virtue of this filing and thus entitled 
to resort to the courts of the State. See Gallaher vs. 
14 
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American Legion,, 277 N.Y.S. 81, and Harris v. American 
Degion, 162 Fed. Supp. 700. 
There is no dispute about the existence of Disabled 
American Veterans, Utah State Department. It has a 
constitution which has been recognized and accepted by 
the national body. This constitution recites that the 
Utah Department has the power to sue (R. 114-115). 
Plaintiff in this case is not an unincorporated asso-
ciation. On the contrary, plaintiff is a state subdivision 
of a national corporation, which subdivision was created 
pursuant to a statutory power given by Congress. The 
national corporation created by Congress is given not 
only power to sue, but also to establish state organiza-
tions and to do any and all acts and things necessary 
and proper to carry out the purposes of the corporation. 
36 USCA 90d. 
This power given by Congress to "Disabled Amer-
ican Veterans'' to establish state organizations is not 
unlike the power given by Congress to national banks 
to establish branch banks. There is no doubt about the 
right of a branch of a national bank to contract and sue. 
It is merely an appendage or extension of the national 
bank, and does business in the name of the parent or-
ganization with a parenthetical identification as to the 
location of the branch. See 12 USCA 36. In fact we 
see this illustrated every day here in Salt Lake City by 
references to national banks and their branches. 
None of the unincorporated associations involved 
in the cases cited by and relied upon by appellant traced 
15 
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their origin to statutes. For this reason the cases relied 
upon by appellant are not in point. 
On the other hand the Utah Supreme Court, just 
as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
can and we feel should decide this case even if we assume 
pliantiff to be an unincorporated association, by its sense 
of justice. In Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees 
Union, 147 Fed. 2d 865, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia held that an unincorporated trade 
union had, in view of its power, influence, size, activities, 
purposes and aims, the capacity to sue and be sued 
irrespective of enabling legislation. The court remarked 
that the sense of justice required such a ruling. Cer-
tainly the sense of justice requires that plaintiff, who 
has statutory origins, be allowed to sue to enforce its 
contracts and fiduciary rights. This court is bound only 
by its own sense of justice and its own precedents. This 
court is not bound by the Federal District Court ruling 
in Americarn. Newspaper Guild -z,·. Macki'YIInon, 108 F. 
Supp. 312, and can enter a judgment consistent with 
equity and fair play just as the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia did in the Busby case, supra. 
Appellant no\Y claims certain property rights in the 
salvage business known as Veterans Foundation. Where 
did these property rights originate? Defendant Young, 
as judge advoeate of plaintiff, prepared a contract 
whereby plaintiff contracted with the Ellisons for the 
establishment and ultimate purchase of the veterans 
salvnge business by plaintiff. Defendant Young also 
prepared the assignment (Exhibit E) whereby plaintiff 
16 
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assigned its rights in this business to appellant. De-
fendants Astle and Mabey signed this assignment in 
behalf of plaintiff. 
The defendant members of the Board of Directors 
of appellant are all fiduciary agents of plaintiff, and 
under the leadership of the trusted legal advisor, de-
fendant Young, betrayed the trust reposed in themselves 
and undertook to give themselves permanent control of 
appellant and of plaintiff's funds, in violation of these 
fiduciary obligations. Appellant even denies the legal 
existence of plaintiff and says it cannot sue to protect 
the rights which its then judge advocate wrote into the 
contract documents. We believe appellants are estopped 
from taking this position and the sense of justice of this 
court will preclude any such result. 
In summary, we submit that plaintiff is a creature 
of statute, not a common law association. Plaintiff's 
existence and powers originated in the Act of Congress. 
Plaintiff does have the power to sue to enforce its legal 
rights and contracts, and defendants and appellant are 
estopped by their own previous conduct from denying 
this legal status of plaintiff. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT ENJOINING AP-
PELLANT FROM FURTHER WITHHOLDING PAY-
MENTS TO PLAINTIFF OF TEN PERCENT OF GROSS 
VOLUME OF SALES OF VETERAN'S FOUNDATION 
IS PROPER AND VALID. 
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If appellant has the legal right to ignore its com-
mitments to pay ten percent of its gross volume of sales 
to plaintiff, and can divert these funds to the local 
chapters or elsewhere at its whim, then it is certainly 
true that the State Department has lost control of its 
own fund raising project. Actually the contrary is true. 
The non-profit corporation which was created to purchase 
the veterans salvage business was born with an obliga-
tion already spelled out and agreed to by the terms of 
the resolution authorizing defendants to incorporate 
"Veterans Foundation." This resolution recited "out 
of the net profits of said corporation an amount equal 
to ten percent of the gross sales shall be paid to the 
Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans by 
said Veterans Foundaiton * * * '' (R. 95). After the 
appellant was duly incorporated it first took an assign-
ment from plaintiff of the latter's rights in the salvage 
business. Next it asserted one of these rights by exer-
cising an option to purchase the business from the Elli-
sons. This was done in a formal written document (R. 
24-28). Three conclusive clauses appear in this contract 
between appellant and the Ellisons. They are: 
1. "Whereas, said Yeterans organization (State 
Department D A V) is desirous of exercising its 
option to purchase said business and has caused 
to be or(Janizcd a non profit corporation under the 
laws or' the State of Utah under the name of 
Veterans Foundation and has assigned to said 
non profit corporation all of its rights in said 
agreement for the purpose of exercising the option 
to purelwse said business \Yhich is to be operated 
for and on behalf of the disabled -veterans, and" 
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(parenthetical language and italics added) (R. 
24). 
2. "Whereas the Veterans Foundation, a non 
profit corporation has agreed to give to the said 
State Department of the Utah Disabled American 
Veterans all of the substantial benefits said or-
ganization is entitled to under its agreement with 
Ellisons, and" (R. 24) (italics added). 
3. ''Ten percent of the gross sales shall be paid 
to the First Party (Appellant) to make it possible 
for it to carry out its commitment with the State 
Department of Utah Disabled American Veterans 
(parenthetical language and italics added) (R. 
25). 
Those three contractual excerpts sustain every con-
tention of plaintiff. Appellant is a fiduciary entity 
created by plaintiff to serve plaintiff. Appellant has 
acknowledged this relationship and obligation in a bind-
ing third party beneficiary contract. Appellant has also 
admitted these same three matters by its answer as 
recited in paragraph 8, (R. 67). These admissions in 
the answer are ample authority for the entry of the 
summary judgment. 
Despite these facts appellant, on March 27, 1958, 
notified plaintiff that no more funds would be paid to 
plaintiff (R. 29-30). Plaintiff moved for a preliminary 
injunction to prevent appellant from withholding the 
funds due to plaintiff (R. 50-51). After argument on 
this motion the parties stipulated for the deposit of the 
ten percent of gross sales with the clerk of the lower court 
for the month of May 1958 (R. 53). Subsequent motions 
were made to impound the money for later months and 
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on September 15, 1958 the lower court ordered the 
monthly ten percent payments to be made to the clerk 
of the court until further order be issued (R. 128). On 
November 14, 1958 the lower court ordered that the funds 
on deposit be paid by the clerk of the court to the plain-
tiff (R. 130). 
This actual history demonstrates most clearly the 
need for a permanent court order enjoining the with-
holding. Apparently appellant would have plaintiff file 
an action at law for each monthly payment as it becomes 
due, instead of disposing of the matter permanently by 
an injunction. One of the most common uses of the 
injunctive power is to obviate a multiplicity of suits, 
the proper remedy in this case. 
However, appellant questions the propriety of the 
injunctive process herein and cites 28 Am. Juris., page 
350, section 159, as authority. We have read this para-
graph and believe it is direct authority for the use of an 
injunction against a corporation. The text provides that 
corporations "ma~T be restrained from actual or threat-
ened breaches of contract.'' By cross reference footnote 
we find this language from 28 Am. Juris., page 270, 
section 77: 
''A court of equity ·will endeavor, to the extent 
of its povvers, to bind men's consciences so far as 
they can be bound to a true and literal perform-
ance of their agreements, and will not suffer them 
to depart from their contracts at pleasure, leav-
ing the party ,,~ith whom they have contracted to 
the mere chance of any damages which a jury may 
gn'f'. It will, therefore, in a proper case, enforce 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a contract by enjoining violations of the terms 
thereof * * *. '' 
Appellant has also erroneously cited language from 
Fletcher's Cyclopedia on Corporations. The language 
quoted by appellant is directed at the use of injunctions 
by a stockholder against management and internal 
affairs of a corporaton. Plaintiff is not suing as a stock-
holder. Plaintiff has direct contract rights, fiduciary 
rights, and also contract rights of a third party bene-
ficiary which it is seeking to enforce. The cases and 
texts cited by appellant are not in point as authority 
against the use of an injunction in this case. 
We are surprised to find appellant quoting from and 
relying upon amended Article IV of its Articles of In-
corporation. The very adoption of this amended article 
precipitated much of the current controversy. This 
amendment was adopted in February 1957, in an abortive 
attempt by appellant to support its position that it could 
divert the ten percent of gross sales away from plaintiff. 
Appellant then also assumed to itself the power to review 
plaintiff's use of its own money, and the right to with-
hold further payments to plaintiff. These are the very 
things plaintiff challenges and were the basis for the 
refused approval of the amendments by the Thomas and 
Holden chapters. No executed contract made by a cor-
poration with a third party or for the benefit of a third 
party can be impaired by any alteration of its own 
charter power. 13 Am. J ur ., page 242, section 96. As 
regards creditors of a corporation who contract with the 
corporation on the faith of the security afforded by the 
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charter, there may be such a contractual obligation as 
will be entitled to constitutional protection. This means 
that constitutional law precepts prevent amendment of 
the charter if the amendments impair the obligations of 
contracts. 13 Am. Jur., page 225, section 81. 
It is settled law that a corporation has no power to 
adopt by-laws which impair or destroy the obligations 
of contracts or vested rights. 
''A corporation has not the capacity, as the 
legislative power from which it derives existence 
has not competency, by- laws of its own enactment 
to disturb or divest rights which it had created, 
or to impair the obligation of its contracts, or to 
change its responsibilities * * *.'' Knights of 
Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436. See also 
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, Vol. 8, pp. 
715 et seq. 
The same legal principles preclude adoption of 
amendments to articles of incorporation which impair 
obligations of contracts. 
The amendments made by appellant ·whereby ap-
pellant assumes the right to withhold moneys which 
legally belong to plaintiff, and to justify this because of 
the changed charter proYisions alone, runs squarely into 
the prohibition against impairment of the obligation of 
contracts. Appellant rannot thus, b~- its unilateral action, 
"lift itself b~' its own bootstraps" and defeat plaintiff's 
rights. This leads us Yery naturall~- into the discussion 
of Point III of this brief. 
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POINT III 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT REQUIRING APPEL-
LANT TO AMEND AND CHANGE ARTICLE IV OF 
APPELLANT'S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION IS 
PROPER AND VALID. 
Since plaintiff's contract rights cannot be impaired 
by appellant's device of simply amending its own charter, 
there must remain in ' the courts the power to order 
amendments to protect those rights. The enjoining 
action of the lower court may partially protect plaintiff, 
but plaintiff and the lower court both thought equity 
and justice required that appeilant's claimed right to 
divert plaintiff's funds to others should be stricken from 
its articles. Certainly the order to amend the Articles 
supplements and supports the injunction. 
Defendants acted in a fiduciary capacity when they 
incorporated appellant. Defendants and appellant admit 
in their answer that defendants "have always regarded 
themselves as trustees for all the members of the D A V 
in Utah,'' * * * and regard themselves under the law 
subject to a high degree of fidelity.'' (R. 75) It is well 
settled that an organizer under these conditions sustains 
a relation of trust and confidence to the corporation. 
This is especially true of charitable organizations. The 
courts impose the fiduciary obligation of an agent or 
trustee upon such organizers, in order to prevent fraud 
or inequitable dealings or to work out contract rights. 
Defendants are already under final court orders which 
could only have been entered as recognition of this 
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fiduciary relationship. See Fletcher Cyclopedia Corpora-
tions, Permarnent Edition, Vol. 1, pp. 611-612. 
Of course a court of equity has the power to order 
a non profit eleemosynary corporation such as appellant 
to delete material from its amended articles when there 
is no dispute about the fact that the added language 
clearly violates fiduciary and trust obligations. Non 
profit eleemosynary corporations such as appellant are 
subject to extreme powers of visitation by courts of 
equity. See 49 Harvard Law Review 369, "Visitatorial 
Jurisdiction over Corporations in Equity" by Roscoe 
Pound. 
Appellant has improperly gone outside the record 
1n this case and set forth considerable material with 
the obvious intention and hope of influencing this court. 
We refer particularly to the discussion about political 
control of plaintiff appearing at pages 17 and 18 of 
appellant's brief. We do not believe it would be proper 
for us to compound this error by setting forth rebuttal 
material, also outside the record. Obviously appellant 
is critical of the constitutional politics of the Disabled 
American Veterans. It finds fault with the method of 
selecting delegates, and with the voting strength which 
these delegates have on the floor of state conventions. 
We believe this to be absolutely immaterial in this case. 
We take special exception to the charge at page 18 of 
appellant's brief that if control of the fund raising 
project is lodged in plaintiff that this would result in 
ehn nging officers and directors of appellant with each 
change of D A V officers. Appellant is ignoring the most 
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important role which the Articles of Incorporation of 
appellant, as amended, play in determining election and 
removal of directors and officers of appellant. The 
directors of appellant are elected for fixed terms and 
can only be removed by two-thirds vote of the members 
present and voting at the annual meeting (R. 42). 
If we assume the facts are as appellant asserts them 
to be, it is easy to see why appellant and defendants are 
fighting so vigorously to divert funds to the local chap-
ters. Appellant asserts at page 18 of its brief that the 
voting power of plaintiff is such that one or two of the 
fourteen local chapters may control plaintiff by reason 
of having large memberships. It is now obvious why 
appellant wants to give ten percent of its gross sales to 
the local chapters instead of to plaintiff. Economic 
coercion and the power of the purse would freeze de-
fendants and appellant in perpetual control of the state 
organization so long as this appellant could grant or 
withhold the ten percent fund to local chapters at its 
whim and caprice. Political loyalty could be exacted as 
the toll for receipt of money. However, we believe this 
whole discussion is out of order and immaterial to the 
issues before this court. The internal politics of the 
D A V is not before this court for judicial approval in 
this case. Contract and fiduciary obligations are before 
the court. The record is more than ample to sustain the 
summary judgment entered below. 
Appellant also went outside the record on page 20 
of its brief by citing and quoting from Article II, Section 
3 of plaintiff's constitution. Even though this material 
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1s improperly before the court, we feel compelled to 
comment on the fallacious argument based thereon. 
None of the defendants who are members of the D A V 
are a.ppellarn.ts in this matter. Appellant Veterans Foun-
dation is not a D A V member. Furthermore the quoted 
section does not even apply to plaintiff, but only restricts 
the bringing of suits by local chapters, not the State 
Department. Thus no one is before this court with any 
color of right to rely on the articles quoted or complain 
about the suit on these grounds. 
Courts of equity have extremely broad powers to 
effectuate their decisions. As the Circuit Court said in 
Un.ited States v. American Tobacco Co., 191 Fed. 371, 
at 386, ''The evils found to exist alone indicate the 
measure required to meet them.'' In anti-trust and 
monopoly cases we very frequently find courts ordering 
dissolution of corporations, divestiture of assets, crea-
tion of new corporations, and enjoining of actions. 
There is nothing very startling about the lower 
court's order to appellant and defendants to amend 
appellant's articles. Appellant is simply directed to 
delete an illegal assumption of power which was first 
inserted by amendments in February-1957. The language 
which the court has ordered appellant to strike from its 
articles purported to give the Board of Directors of 
appellant (who a.rC' defendants in this case) the discre-
tionary power to divert funds from the State Depart-
ment to the local chapters. It is perfectly proper for a 
court of equity to use its ancillary powers to order a 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
charitable non profit corporation and its individual 
board members to strike this illegally assumed power 
from its charter. 
All of the cases cited by appellant as denying a 
court the right to intervene in internal affairs of a 
corporation recognize that a court can intervene when 
fraud or abuse of power or oppressive actions are in-
volved. What greater abuse is there in the eyes of the 
law than the betrayal of a :fiduciary trust~ Defendants 
and appellant have denied their :fiduciary obligations 
with plaintiff, and asserted their intention to continue 
this denial. Equity can order a non profit, non stock 
corporation to delete such illegally assumed powers from 
its articles. 
We are not bothered about the contempt problems 
raised by appellant on page 22 of its brief. Defendants 
Hendrixson, Reese, Mabey, Gray and Young (Board 
members of appellant) are already in violation of a :final 
court order requiring amendment of appellant's articles. 
If plaintiff prevails in this court, we have no doubt that 
contempt citations to defendants and appellant, if neces-
sary, will very promptly result in the proper amend-
ments being made. This court is not without the means 
to enforce a judgment ordering amendment. 
In Arbour v. Pittsburgh Produce Trade Ass'n., 44 
Pa. Super, 240, the suit was in equity by a retail produce 
dealer to enjoin a trade association, incorporated under 
a general law, from enforcing by-laws by which the 
members were required to refuse to sell on credit or for 
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spot cash to any person indebted to any member of the 
association. Provision was also made for arbitration by 
members of the association of claims of members against 
persons blacklisted as delinquent in meeting indebted-
ness to members. A decree ordering that the words ''or 
for spot cash" be stricken out, that the provision as to 
arbitration by members of the association be declared 
void, and that the association be enjoined from making 
or enforcing any such by-laws was affirmed. This same 
court also quoted and approved the following language 
from State ex rel Cuppel vs. Milwaukee Chamber of 
Commerce, 47 Wis. 670: 
''The visitorial or superintending power of 
the state over corporations created by the legis-
lature will always be exercised, in proper cases, 
through the medium of the courts of the state to 
keep those corporations within the limits of their 
lawful powers * * *. '' 
Non profit charitable corporations are clothed with 
a public interest which makes them even more subject 
to powers of courts of equity than private profit cor-
porations. Courts exercising their broad equity powers 
may function in a visitorial manner, particularly over 
a charitable corporation. See 49 Harcard Law Review 
369. 
Plaintiff 1s compelled to comment upon one more 
factual assertion of appellant which is not supported 
by the record. On page 18 of its brief appellant states 
that none of the officers or directors of appellant (de-
fendants) receive any material benefit by serving the 
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appellant corporation. Plaintiff denies this and cites 
appellant's and defendants' admissions in their answer 
(R. 73) as proof that this statement is untrue. Some 
peculiar motivation prompts defendants to persist in 
their claimed right to substitute their personal desires 
for their legal obligations with respect to plaintiff's 
funds, and it appears to be both pecuniary arnd political. 
Appellant challenges the power of the court to order 
amendment of appellant's articles because this was not 
included in plaintiff's prayer for relief. Any court of 
equity can refuse to grant relief requested and in lieu 
thereof grant some alternative relief. Skinrner v. Red-
ding, (Delaware), 48 A. 2d 809. Plaintiff asked the lower 
court to remove defendants as directors of appellant, 
which the court declined to do. In lieu thereof the court 
ordered the amendment of appellant's articles, a very 
proper alternative. 
CONCLUSION 
There could be no more persuasive or conclusive 
proof of the betrayal of their fiduciary trust by defend-
ants and appellant than the necessity and existence of 
this very litigation. The persistent denial to plaintiff 
of its own funds, and the vigorous fight to retain the 
power to divert these funds for political or pecuniary 
profit to defendants compels a judgment requiring appel-
lant to amend its articles and enjoining appellant from 
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further withholding payments to plaintiff of ten percent 
of the gross volume of sales of appellant. The judgment 
of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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